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Chinese Fisheries Economics ›› 2025, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (3) : 10.

Policy Research

黄锦辉，郭晓丹*，孙鹏

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Abstract

The summer fishing moratorium system is an effective means to protect fishery resources, and its function depends on the exploration of the game strategy of each subject. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper uses evolutionary game model to construct game matrix, analyzes the differentiated equilibrium of system implementation with or without the intervention of superior government, and carries out simulation analysis. The results show that: 1) Without external intervention, fishermen and local governments cannot evolve to the optimal stability strategy; 2) The intervention and supervision of the superior government under specific conditions can encourage fishermen and local governments to actively implement the fishing moratorium system; 3) The pressure of local economic growth and the expected income loss of fishermen are the main constraints to the implementation of the system.The sustainable implementation of the summer fishing moratorium system needs to rely on a strong reciprocal incentive mechanism led by the superior government. By balancing ecological protection and fishermen's livelihoods, reducing supervision costs and optimizing the policy environment, multi-party collaborative governance can be achieved.

Key words

evolutionary game / fishing moratorium / fishermen retire from fishing / simulation analysis / government rewards and punishments

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